In response to 'no one''s comments, the Condorcet (MAM) voting method
will not 'split the vote' between the very-similar games pointed out by
Fergus. The method satisfies the following criterion:
[from http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/]
independence of clone alternatives (ICA, promoted by TN Tideman):
If there is a subset of alternatives such that no voter ranks any
alternative outside the subset between any alternatives in the
subset, then the election outcome must not change if a strict subset
of that subset is deleted from the votes and from the set of
nominees.
A sample election, where B and B' are the 'clones' (they may be from
the same party, or just be very similar in some way):
40%: A > B > B'
30%: B > B' > A
30%: B' > B > A
In a plurality voting system, such as you might be used to, A would win
over B and B'. But in any Condorcet method, B would win, because B would
win in an election against any single opponent.
In response to 'no one''s comments, the Condorcet (MAM) voting method will not 'split the vote' between the very-similar games pointed out by Fergus. The method satisfies the following criterion: [from http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/] independence of clone alternatives (ICA, promoted by TN Tideman): If there is a subset of alternatives such that no voter ranks any alternative outside the subset between any alternatives in the subset, then the election outcome must not change if a strict subset of that subset is deleted from the votes and from the set of nominees. A sample election, where B and B' are the 'clones' (they may be from the same party, or just be very similar in some way): 40%: A > B > B' 30%: B > B' > A 30%: B' > B > A In a plurality voting system, such as you might be used to, A would win over B and B'. But in any Condorcet method, B would win, because B would win in an election against any single opponent.